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Abstract
Prolonged rapid growth, i.e. a “catching-up” process, is known to be accompanied by
high rates of household saving. This phenomenon is central in explaining the direction
of international capital flows and trade imbalances in the past several decades, yet it is
very much in contradiction to prevailing macroeconomic theory. This paper finds that
a standard life-cycle model, even when integrated with uncertainty about future growth
and credit constraints, is completely unable to replicate the relations between growth
and saving as seen in the data. However, adding utility from relative consumption to
the model allows for the full replication of these relations.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of high saving rates accompanying rapid growth is well known in the
economic literature. Modigliani (1970) notes it with relation to post world-war II Europe.
More recently it is usually identified with the rapidly growing Asian economies. Deaton
and Paxson (2000) state, based on cross-country evidence, that a one percent increase in
per-capita growth is accompanied by a two percent increase in the saving rate.
However, standard infinite horizon representative agent models predict the opposite - the
higher is the expected growth, the more is the agent to borrow. In the international context,
this means that a relatively poor but rapidly developing country is supposed to run trade
deficits, essentially borrowing from slow-growing rich countries at the expense of its future
wealth. Reality is often the complete opposite.
It has been suggested that it is the higher propensity to save that is causing the higher
growth, a-la` a Solow style model. However, as Carroll and Weil (1994) and Andersson (1999)
show, it is higher growth that precedes higher saving rates and not the other way around;
hence it is more likely that causality runs from growth to saving. While a positive causality
from saving to growth cannot be ruled out,1 clearly the saving decision must be optimal given
growth expectations. Since much of the greater saving-to-GDP ratio is attributed to higher
household saving rates,2, than the question of saving-rate optimality should be discussed
from the household’s perspective, rather than some central planner’s.
Another suggested explanation is that both saving and growth are attributable to some
cultural characteristics. For example, the rapid growth and high saving rates in East Asia
can be the result of Confucian values shared by many countries in that region. This line of
argument fails, however, to account for several facts. First, high saving rates have historically
accompanied prolonged rapid growth (a “catching-up” process) in many countries across the
1For example, Aghion et al. (2016) suggest a model in which domestic savings allow domestic banks to
co-finance foreign technologically advanced investment and thus foster growth.
2For example, Ando and Kennickell (1986) find that during the high-growth period in Japan, households
in all age groups there were saving much more than their US counterparts. Chamon and Prasad (2010) show
a rapid increase in the Chinese household saving rate over the last several decades.
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world. While much of the current discussion is about China, this phenomenon has been
seen in post world-war II Europe, in Japan, the four tigers (Korea, Taiwan, Hong-Kong and
Singapore), in Ireland, Chile, and more recently in Vietnam and India. Second, as discussed
above, saving increases following a rise in growth. Why then have Confucian values not
made households save in high rates all along? Finally, Carroll et al. (1994) and Carroll et al.
(1999) look at the effect of cultural background on saving behavior among immigrants, and
do not find a correlation with the saving rates at the countries of origin. Therefore, it seems
appropriate to investigate the growth-saving correlation in generality, and not to relegate it
to cultural attributes.
Modigliani (1966) attempts to explain the causality from growth to saving using a life-
cycle model. The intuition behind this explanation is simple: since it is the young that save
(toward retirement) and the old that dissave (being retired), growth, making the young richer
compared to the old, should raise the saving rate. However, as Tobin (1967) and Carroll and
Summers (1991) note, this explanation requires that growth increases income from cohort
(age group) to cohort, but not within a cohort (i.e. growth does not affect an existing agent’s
lifetime income, but rather increases the lifetime income of a “newborn” agent with respect
to the previous-generation agent), otherwise the young, expecting higher future income,
would lose their motivation to save. Carroll and Summers (1991) bring evidence to refute
this assumption (i.e. they show that growth increases the income of people of all ages), and
argue that this invalidates Modigliani’s life-cycle explanation completely. Another attempt
to explain this direction of causality is made by Carroll and Weil (1994) and Carroll et
al. (2000), using a habit formation mechanism.3 While habit formation may indeed create
a positive relation from growth to saving, by shifting consumption to the future (where
the agent is more “spoiled”), examining Chinese data, Chamon and Prasad (2010) find no
evidence of it. Gruber (2018) demonstrates empirically that household saving behavior is
determined by relative, rather than absolute, income level, and argues that utility from
3The latter paper also contains an illuminating literature review of the topic.
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relative income and wealth can explain both the higher saving rates by the relatively rich
and the positive relation between growth and saving.
In addition to its effect on the saving rate, rapid growth seems to have two more effects,
closely related to each other: In Carroll and Summers (1991), the authors also find that
households in rapidly growing countries experience a higher rate of increase in their con-
sumption expenditure compared to their peers in lower growth countries. This phenomenon,
also observed in Lee et al. (2014), which Carroll et al. (2000) seek to explain with habit
formation, is also inconsistent with the standard Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) and
life cycle models. A second related phenomenon, observed in Carroll and Summers (1991),
is that the cross-sectional profile of consumption by age is quite similar across countries with
very different aggregate growth rates.
This paper quantifies and measures the ability of a life-cycle model to generate the fol-
lowing three stylized facts, observed in the literature: one, a positive relation from aggregate
growth to the aggregate household saving ratio (with growth fully affecting the income path
of individual cohorts); two, a correlation between the aggregate growth rate and the house-
hold expenditure growth rate over the life cycle; and three, a consumption-age cross-sectional
distribution that is largely invariant to aggregate growth.
Furthermore, this paper looks at the effect of augmenting the life-cycle model with three
elements - uncertainty about future growth, credit constraints and utility from relative con-
sumption (also known as “keeping up with the Jonses”) - on its ability to generate the
stylized facts. While the standard elements – growth uncertainty and credit constraints
– are insufficient in accounting for the growth-saving relation, the element of utility from
relative consumption allows the model to replicate all three stylized facts: the correlation
between growth and saving, the rapid increase of consumption expenditure over the house-
hold life-cycle and the stability of the consumption-age cross section, as observed in growing
economies.
Section 2 presents the life-cycle model used, and the addition of growth uncertainty and
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credit constraints to the model. Section 3 describes the modeling of utility from relative
consumption. The respective foci of sections 4 and 5 are the calibration and simulation of
the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Life-cycle Model
The demand side of the economy is represented by a household life-cycle model. Each
period t one household is created and one is destroyed. Each household exists for J periods,
so that there exists one household for each household age j from one to J . Each household
has the following identical lifetime utility function:
U =
J∑
j=1
βj−1u (cj, j), (1)
where cj, abbreviated from c(j, t, g, r) for convenience, is the consumption of a household at
age j at time t, under growth rate g and interest rate r. The household’s intra-period utility
varies with age, and is of the following form:
u (j, cj) = q (j)
c1−θj − 1
1− θ
, (2)
where q(j) is what shall be referred to as the “life-cycle multiplier”, putting weights on utility
in different periods in the household’s life cycle. This is an element that is often thought of as
the average number of equivalent adults for household age j.4 Here the path of the life-cycle
multiplier over the life of the household will be referred to as the “household regime” (i.e.
{q(j)}Jj=1).
The demographic transition that typically takes place over the development process may
also affect the households’ saving decisions. One could argue, for example, that since we
observe the average number of children per household diminishes with economic moderniza-
4See, for example, Tobin (1967), Modigliani (1970, 1986), Mariger (1987) and Gourinchas and Parker
(2002).
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tion, the household regime should vary with the level of development. In addition, changes
in birth rates would also lead to changes in the elderly support ratio. Another example is the
effect of development on the norm, common in many developing countries, of elderly parents
moving in with their children. There is firm evidence that prolonged development, such
as discussed in this paper, lowers the rate in which this phenomenon takes place.5 Thus a
young person expecting long term growth should not overly rely on the support of his or her
children after retirement. Curtis et al. (2015) argue that these demographics changes play a
large role in explaining the increase in the Chinese household saving rate. While that may
be the case in China, the phenomenon of high growth and high saving rates has occurred in
different countries with different demographic compositions. Therefore, this paper abstracts
away from this element. In light of the above, and following evidence (discussed in Section
4) that the consumption-age profile is very stable, the household regime is assumed to be
time invariant.
The household’s effective labor units, l, are assumed to change over the household’s age,
j. This is attributed to changes in experience, improved position in the workplace, as well as
physical and mental abilities varying with age. The total number of effective units of labor
at the economy is assumed to be constant at unity:
J∑
j=1
l(j) = 1. (3)
The household’s labor income over the life-cycle is therefore dependent upon household
age j and the prevailing wage per effective unit of labor at the time period, W (t, g):
w(j, t, g) = l(j)W (t, g), (4)
where w(j, t, g) is the labor income of a household of age j at time t under a prevailing
constant growth rate of g. W (t, g) is growing at rate g, hence growth fully affects the
5See UN (2005).
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household’s labor income over the life cycle (i.e. the “life cycle income effect”). Thus this
model is not subject to the Carroll and Summers (1991) critique.
Under the assumption that the economy is small and open to capital flows,6 so that the
interest rate, r, is exogenous, discounted lifetime income is:
Ω (t, g, r) =
J∑
j=1
(1 + r)−j+1w (j, t+ j − 1, g) =
J∑
j=1
(1 + r)−j+1 l(j)W (t+ j − 1, g). (5)
The discounted lifetime consumption expenditure of a household created at time t in an
economy with a constant growth rate of g and with an international interest rate r is:
C (t, g, r) =
J∑
j=1
(1 + r)−j+1 cj. (6)
Each individual household is thus facing the following utility maximization problem at
the time of its creation:
max
J∑
j=1
βj−1q (j)
c1−θj −1
1−θ
s.t.
C(t, g, r) = Ω (t, g, r) ,
(7)
where the households optimize their respective consumption streams under the constraint of
their lifetime labor income.
2.1 Uncertainty of Future Growth
In the general life-cycle model above the households are assumed to know with certainty
that growth will continue at a constant rate throughout their lifetime. While, barring a
major catastrophe, the fluctuation in lifetime income an average household in the developed
6This assumption seems appropriate for countries starting out on the development path. It may become
less appropriate as the economy grows, as it may reach a size sufficient to influence international capital
markets. This paper abstracts away from such situations in the interest of simplicity.
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world can expect are relatively mild, that may not be the case for a household in a rapidly
developing country.7 Such a country is in a process of catching up to the developed world
“frontier”, and is able to grow rapidly by adopting existing technologies and practices. It is,
however, bound to run out of such technologies once it reaches the development frontier. Its
growth rate should then slow down and be in line with the rest of the developed countries.
Such a stop can be abrupt (e.g. Japan) or slow and gradual (e.g. Hong-Kong and Singapore).
It is quite difficult to establish the point in which a country has reached its development
frontier.8
In addition, it is also possible for a country to drop out of the catching-up process
altogether, without reaching the development frontier. After all, as Parente and Prescott
(1993) note, the vast majority of developing countries are not in the process of catching up.
Being the exception rather than the rule, one can certainly imagine that this process may
stop or be derailed; that the unique circumstances causing it may change, or put differently,
that whatever factor that was holding the country back to begin with may return. The
catching up process might depend on a unique political situation, on geopolitical stability,
on the state of the world economy or even on natural events (rainfall, flooding etc.). The
effect of the 1997 Asian crisis on some of the local economies is a possible example of such
a case, as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have yet to regain the levels of
growth enjoyed pre-crisis.
While we do see several countries that are enjoying or have enjoyed a fairly stable stretch
of rapid growth over several decades, it may be that their success was far from certain ex-ante.
For example, a Japanese household living during the second half of the 20th century had no
way of knowing how long would rapid growth continue, and had to take the eventuality of
an abrupt stop at any point in time into consideration when making its saving decisions.
Given all of the above, it seems fit to introduce uncertainty into the model. This is done
7This model has no idiosyncratic shocks. Such shocks, assuming that they are not influenced by the rate
of growth, are unlikely to explain the higher rate of saving in a rapidly growing economy.
8For an in depth modeling and discussion of the catching-up process, see Acemoglu et al. (2006).
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in the following fashion: Each period, all households perceive a risk of constant probability
λ for the country to drop out of its high growth regime (where it grows at rate gH) into
an absorbing low growth regime (where growth equals gL).
9 This drop is considered to be
permanent by all existing households (the country will grow slowly for the rest of their lives).
This can be formulated in the form of a Bellman equation:
V H(aj, j) = max
cj
u(cj, j) + β
{
λV L(aj+1, j + 1) + (1− λ)V
H(aj+1, j + 1)
}
(8)
s.t. aj+1 = (aj + wj − cj)(1 + r), aJ+1 = 0, (9)
where a is asset stock, j is household age, and:
V L(aj, j) = max
ct
J∑
t=j
βt−ju(ct, t), (10)
s.t.
J∑
t=j
(1 + r)j−tct = aj +
J∑
t=j
(1 + r)j−tl(t)W (j)(1 + gL)
t−j. (11)
However, since it is the rapid growth scenario that is of interest here, the households
pleasantly discover each period that the high growth regime is still in effect. Thus they
re-optimize their consumption decisions each period. The effect of this form of uncertainty
is that lifetime wealth is gradually realized to be higher than expected over the household
lifetime, and the consumption profile is constantly updated upwards. This effect is obviously
stronger the higher is the high regime’s growth rate compared to that of the low regime.
Equations 8 to 10 lead to the following Euler equation:
uc(c
H
j , j) = (1 + r)β
{
λuc(c
L
j+1, j + 1)
(1 + φL)1−γ
+
(1− λ)uc(c
H
j+1, j + 1)
(1 + φH)1−γ
}
, (12)
9It is reasonable to believe that λ should actually become higher as the country approaches the devel-
opment frontier. Such variations in λ are abstracted from for simplicity.
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where cHj+1 is the optimal consumption choice at period j + 1 given that the high growth
regime remains in effect, and cLj+1 is optimal consumption given a regime switch to low
growth at period j + 1.
2.2 Credit Constraints
Rapid growth creates a great disparity in terms of lifetime wealth between younger and
older cohorts in the economy. This disparity is so substantial that the saving decisions
of older generations become negligible, and aggregate saving behavior is determined almost
entirely by younger generations. Modigliani (1970) argues that this disparity should increase
the aggregate saving rate, as the young save (for retirement) and the old dissave (during
retirement). Carroll and Summers (1991) argue that growth affects the future income of
the younger cohorts, therefore causing them to save less and even dissave at the expense of
future income, reducing the aggregate saving rate (i.e. henceforth referred to as the “life
cycle income effect”).
Paramount to the latter is the ability of the younger cohorts to take advantage of their
high future income through borrowing. Such borrowing, however, would put these cohorts
in the realm of negative asset value. This raises the issue of incentives to default on debt
through bankruptcy for the individual household (when the cost of bankruptcy is lower than
the debt itself), and the possibility of aggregate risk to lending institutions under growth
uncertainty - if the entire economy switches into a low growth regime, a large portion of
indebted households may find their future income much lower compared to their current
debt, and default, bankrupting the lending institutions in the process.
A possible implication of these issues is a credit constraint, preventing the households
from borrowing too much at the expense of the future, and restricting the dissaving of
the young cohorts. As Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show, using a three period overlapping
generations model, a credit constraint may raise the saving rate and strengthen the effect of
growth on saving.
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This paper uses the following credit constraint formulation:
aj ≥ κΩj, (13)
where Ωj is expected discounted future labor income, so that:
Ωj =
J∑
t=j
(1 + r)j−tEj [wt] , (14)
and κ is some number between 0 (a non-negativity constraint) and −1 (no constraint).
The value of κ may reflect the strength and accessibility of the financial system, as well as
intergenerational lending. Since the ability of individuals to amass debt is very limited even
in developed economies, one would expect a κ near zero to be a reasonable approximation.
A possible caveat, however, is that intergenerational transfers (such as bequests) could move
young households away from the credit constraints and allow a dissaving pattern similar to
the unconstrained case.
The algorithm detailed in Mariger (1987) is used to compute consumption paths given
credit constraints.
3 Relative Consumption
The role of relative consumption has long been a topic of economic discussion, as ev-
idenced by Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949). In a finding known as the ‘Easterlin
paradox’, Easterlin (1974) observes that while the rich are generally happier than the poor
within a given country, average happiness in rich countries is not greater than in poor ones,
and economic growth does not seem to increase average happiness over time. More recently,
Luttmer (2005) finds that higher levels of consumption by neighbors lead to lower reported
household happiness levels. Jin et al. (2011) find that local inequality increases household
saving rates in China, and Gruber (2018) establishes relative income to be a central deter-
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minant of household saving behavior, also for China.
Consider the following function, based on the Gal´ı (1994) formulation, for the household’s
within-period utility:10
u(j, cj, c¯t,g) = q (j)
c1−θj c¯
γθ
t,g
1− θ
. (15)
cj, as noted in Section 2, is the consumption of a household of age j at time t, given growth
rate g and a constant international interest rate r. c¯t,g is the average household consumption
at time t given growth rate g, and γ is assumed to be between zero and one. q(j) is the
household regime, as detailed in Section 2.
The lifetime utility function is therefore:
U =
J∑
j=1
βj−1u(j, cj, c¯t,g), (16)
The above, in conjunction with a standard budget constraint (see Equation 7), yields the
following Euler equation:
ct+1 =
[
q(t+ 1)
q(t)
(1 + r)β
] 1
θ
(1 + g)γct (17)
As Harbaugh (1996), Carroll et al. (1997) and Gruber (2018) discuss, a relative con-
sumption element may generate a causal relation from economic growth to the saving rate.
Equation 17 demonstrates that with economic growth the surrounding average level of con-
sumption is constantly rising, and the agent’s optimal consumption path is exponentially
increasing. This trend places the bulk of consumption later in life, when income is low (due
to retirement), thus necessitating more saving earlier on.
10This formulation is chosen for its elegance. However, other formulations could generate similar dynamics.
See for example Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008).
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4 Calibration
In order to examine the actual impact of adding the previously described elements on
the ability of the life cycle model to explain the positive correlation of growth and saving,
the parameters of the model need to first be calibrated. Of these parameters, some have
fairly accepted values (or ranges) in the economic literature (e.g. α, β and θ), while others
are more elusive (i.e. q(j) and l(j)). For the former, values within the commonly accepted
ranges are used, as follows:
Parameter Value
T (length of household lifecycle) 55
θ (consumption utility risk averseness coefficient) 4
α (Cobb-Douglas capital intensity) 0.33
β (time preference) 0.95
δ (depreciation rate) 0.05
r (international real interest rate) 5%
Table 1: Calibration of Model Parameters
The life cycle parameters q(j) and l(j) are calibrated using US data. The reason for using
US data, rather than data from a rapidly growing country, is to avoid the suspicion that
there is something special about such a country’s income and/or consumption age profile that
would generate an saving behavior different than that of other countries. The calibration
strategy for q(j) and l(j) is detailed below.
Time periods are measured in years. Households are assumed to exist for 55 years (ap-
proximately ages 25 to 80).11
Using the fact that c (j, t, g, r) = c (j, (t− j + 1) + j − 1, g, r), q(j), the household’s life-
cycle multiplier, can be backed out of actual household consumption data, assuming that
1 + r ≈ 1
β
. 12 First, the equation is rewritten in matrix form:
11This assumption may seem somewhat problematic, considering the changes in longevity and social
structure that come hand in hand with economic development. However, it is still a good approximation:
while life expectancy is lower in less developed countries, the differences conditional on fact that the individual
has reached adulthood and was able to create an independent household are much smaller.
12A small open economy assumption.
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Ct = X · q/(Ytq), (18)
where ‘·’ denotes pointwise (element by element, or Hadamard) multiplication and ‘/’ denotes
pointwise division.
Ct(j) is the consumption share of cohort j at period t, X(j) = (1+ g)
−j+1, and Yt(i, j) =
(1 + r)−j+1.
In other words, the model attributes consumption variation across cohorts to the different
values of q(j) as well as growth.13 Equation 18 above can be rewritten in the following form:
Ct/Xι
′ · Ytq = q, (19)
where ι is a J × 1 vector of ones.
Thus q is simply the first eigenvector of the matrix Ct/Xι · Yt.
US Consumer Expenditure (CEX) survey data on household consumption for years 1984-
2005 is used.14 As can be seen in figure 4, consumption patterns in the data remain very
consistent over the years.15 Normalizing the data from different years to get consumption
shares, averaging between the years, and using a cubic spline extrapolation (raised to the
power of θ), gives an approximation of q(j), which is then normalized to sum up to unity.
The resulting household regime is hump shaped, peaking when the age of the household
head is around 50 (this corresponds to household age 25). This is very similar to the findings
of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
Having experimented with a variety of household regimes, I find that, save for extreme
and unreasonable cases, using different household regimes of the general hump shape does
13It is worth noting that other elements, (i.e. growth uncertainty, credit constraints and utility from
relative consumption), can cause and/or influence the cohort consumption distribution. Since the calibration
is using US data for periods averaging about 2% annual per capita growth, then as will be demonstrated in
Section 5, these elements should not have a substantial influence.
14According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the average US real interest rate was
just over 5% in this period, making the approximation of (1 + r)β ≈ 1 very good for a β value of 0.95.
15This is in line with the findings of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and Ando and Kennickell (1986) with
respect to the US and Japan.
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Figure 1: Calibrating the household regime, the weighting (q) on the household consumption
utility by period
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not affect results substantially.
Calibrating l(j), the effective labor units of the household over its life-cycle, is even more
straight forward: again use CEX data (years 1984-2005) on the wage income of different
household cohorts is used to extrapolate the household’s lifetime wage path. The calibration
is presented in figure 2.
The hump shape of the estimated effective labor units over the life cycle is not surpris-
ing: effective labor units increase with age, likely due to experience and acquired position,
peaking, much like the household regime, around the household head age of 50. They then
start to fall rapidly, likely due to retirement and natural physical deterioration.
Notice that this formulation assumes that the distribution of effective labor units over the
life cycle is unaffected by growth. However, this may not be the case in reality, as the rapid
technological changes associated with high growth rates may favor young workers, capable of
quick learning and adjustment, over their older, more experienced counterparts. That being
said, this aspect of the labor market is not explored in this paper. Another caveat is the
suspicion that surveys overstate average income for the last age bracket, since the number
of observations for that category drops considerably, possibly causing a selection bias.
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Figure 2: The household’s effective labor units (l) over the life cycle
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5 Simulation
5.1 The Life Cycle Baseline Model
The baseline model has constant growth with no uncertainty (λ = 0) and no credit
constraints (κ = −1). As figure 3 demonstrates, this simple life cycle model does generate a
positive relation from growth to saving for the 0% to 4% per capita growth interval. However,
slighly after 4% the relation becomes negative, with the saving rate at 9% roughly equal to
that of 0%. This result is not in accordance with the monotonically positive correlation
between growth and saving seen in the data.
In conjunction with the investment line, this saving curve predicts a positive current
account for economies in the growth range of roughly 1% to 5% (for the given international
interest rate and depreciation rate).
Breaking down the aggregate effect to the household level, we can see that growth causes
the younger cohorts to dissave, much like the Carroll and Summers (1991) argument. As
can be seen in figure 4, it also causes households to save more during middle-age years.
Thus, in a high growth regime, consumption is relatively ”‘smoothed”’ as households borrow
substantially in their early, low income years, then save high amounts during middle-age
years to pay back for early borrowing as well as amass assets for consumption during later
years, when wage income dwindles down to nil.
Growth creates a wealth disparity between cohorts. Thus aggregate saving is influenced
by the young generations dissaving much more than by the increased saving of the middle
aged cohorts, as Figure 5 demonstrates, and can be seen to be grow up to the 4% growth
regime and decrease thereafter.
In addition to failing to provide a persistent strong relation between growth and saving
(on the aggregate level) over a range of high growth rates, the baseline model also does
not predict an increasing path of household consumption over the lifetime in high growth
regimes. This correlation between higher household consumption expenditure growth rates
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Figure 3: Saving and investment ratios as a function of the growth rate, baseline life cycle
model
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Figure 4: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, baseline model
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Figure 5: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, baseline model
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correlated and higher aggregate growth is demonstrated in both Carroll and Summers (1991)
and Lee et al. (2014).
Another result of the simulation is the massive gap between the consumption of young
and old cohorts. For example, under a regime of 8% per-capita growth, a household of cohort
1 (the head of the household is 25-26) has over 10 times the consumption of a household of
cohort 40 (who’s head is 59-60). Empirically, as Carroll and Summers (1991) and Lee et al.
(2014) show, no such gap exists, and the old cohorts of a rapidly growing economy are no
worse off compared to younger cohorts than those of a slowly growing economy.
5.2 Growth Uncertainty
Growth uncertainty is modeled here as a constant probability λ that the economy will
drop from its high growth state to an absorbing low growth state (the high growth state
cannot be resumed). The effect of this drop is of course stronger the larger is the gap
between the two states, e.g. a drop from 8% annual per capita growth to 0% is obviously
to be dreaded much more than a drop from 4% to 2%. In this simulation the absorbing low
growth regime is assumed to be 1% per capita output growth.
Since the state of interest here is that of prolonged high growth, then regardless of the
size of λ, the drop to low growth never actually occurs. In other words, while households
are forced to plan for low growth eventualities, we are interested only in observing the
high growth realizations of this stochastic process. The effect on household saving decisions
is twofold: on the one hand it is forced to save toward a future where its income is no
longer growing like it used to. This is reminiscent of a precautionary saving motive. On
the other hand, since we are observing only the high growth realizations, the household’s
expected future income is constantly updated upwards, resulting in an ex-post sub-optimal
expenditure path where it is borrowing less than it would had its high future income been
certain.
As Figure 6 shows, a λ of 5% greatly reduces dissaving during early years in the model.
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However, the magnifying effect of growth (i.e. young household being so much wealthier) is
strong enougn that this dissaving eventually overwhelms the increased saving of middle-aged
cohorts, as Figure 7 shows, though at higher growth rates than the baseline case, as shown
in Figure 8.
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Figure 6: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, with growth uncertainty (λ = 5%)
Notice also that comparing Figures 4 and 6, it is evident that at 2% growth, uncertainty
only generates an extermely minute difference in the household expenditure path. This goes
to show that not including the uncertainty element in the process of calibrating q should
produce no major bias.
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Figure 7: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with growth uncertainty (λ =
5%)
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Figure 8: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of growth uncertainty
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It can be seen that the presence of uncertainty can be very influential in increasing
household saving and decreasing the tendency of the younger cohorts to dissave. A risk of
λ = 2%, which is extremely low considering it results in an average high growth period of
50 years, is enough to greatly reduce the negative effect of growth on saving in high growth
rates. Higher levels of risk further flatten the growth-saving graph (Figure 8), so that, while
still decreasing after some point, the simulated saving rate remains much higher for the high
values of growth than for the low values.
In addition, growth uncertainty further reduces the expenditure gap between young and
old cohorts. For example, the ratio of the expenditure of cohorts 1 and 40 is reduced to
to 3 to 1 under 8% growth. It does not, however, provide increasing life-cycle expenditure
profiles.
In summary, adding growth uncertainty does not allow the life-cycle model to replicate
the three stylized facts of growth and saving.
5.3 Credit Constraints
Credit constraints, inhibiting the ability of younger generations to dissave, can have a
powerful impact on aggregate saving. As Figure 9 shows, the constraint needs to be quite
tight for there to be a significant effect, as κ = −0.1 is almost identical to κ = −1 (the no
constraint case). Clearly once the younger cohorts are able to borrow 10% of their future
wealth the constraints are no longer binding. A non-negativity constraint (κ = 0) is shown
in Figure 9 to stop the negative effect of growth on the aggregate saving rate seen in the
standard life-cycle model above 4% per capita growth, and creates a saving rate plateau all
the way up to 10% per capita growth (the upper limit of the simulation).
Figure 10 shows the effects of a non-negativity constraint (κ = 0) on the household’s life
cycle expenditure. The higher is growth, the longer is the household bound by the constraint.
With younger cohorts unable to borrow, the amplifying effect of growth makes the savings
of middle-aged cohorts outweigh the dissavings of older cohorts. Notice however that the
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Figure 9: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of credit constraints
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credit constraints element does not lead to an increasing path of life cycle consumption, and
thus falls short of matching the data on its own.
Notice also that at 2% per capita growth the range in which the constraints hold is very
minimal. Since they do not seem to affect the expenditure path at this growth rate, it is
superfluous to include credit constraints in the q calibration process.
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Figure 10: Household life cycle expenditure and wage, with credit constraints (κ = 0%)
As Figure 11 shows, credit constraints also decrease the simulated intra-cohort consump-
tion disparity. For example, the ratio of period 1 cohorts and period 40 cohorts expenditure
under a growth rate of 8% to be about 2 to 1.
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Figure 11: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with credit constraints (κ = 0%)
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In summary, adding growth uncertainty does not allow the life-cycle model to replicate
the three stylized facts of growth and saving.
5.4 Relative Consumption
With γ set to one (see Equation 15), the effects of utility from relative consumption
are simulated. As can be seen in Figure 12, the increase in average consumption, caused
by economic growth, does indeed lead the households to consume a larger proportion of
their income during later years, and to continue to save when young despite their increasing
income path. Young cohorts not only save instead of dissaving, but their period of saving
is actually extended to later years in the lifecycle. Utility from relative consumption thus
enables the lifecycle model to replicate the correlation between the aggregate growth rate
and the growth rate of individual consumption over the lifecycle.
The effect is strong, and substantially changes the aggregate picture, as Figures 13 and
14 demonstrate. Since growth pushes young cohorts to save rather than dissave, than, just
as Modigliani (1970) argues, the higher lifetime wealth of the young compared to the old
increases the aggregate saving rate. In addition, as Figure 13 shows, growth does not skew
the consumption-age cross section.
Figure 14 shows the effect of growth on the aggregate saving rate with utility from relative
consumption (γ = 1). The effect is different than under the growth uncertainty and credit
constraint elements, as the positive effect of growth on saving now extends to higher growth
levels instead of tapering out. Notice also that the implication of the results presented in
Figure 14 is that slow growth countries should have trade deficits, whereas high growth
countries would have surpluses, with a cut-off growth rate of about 5% per capita. It is
important to note in this context that this is a partial equilibrium analysis, holding the
interest rate constant. Different interest rates would change both the investment and saving
rates for the different growth levels, yielding different cut-offs.
These results confirm that utility from relative consumption allows the life-cycle model
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Figure 12: Household life cycle consumption, expenditure and wage, with relative consump-
tion (γ = 1)
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Figure 13: Cross section of household expenditure and wage, with relative consumption
(γ = 1)
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Figure 14: Saving and growth with relative consumption (γ = 1)
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to simulate well the three stylized facts stated in the introduction: high growth economies
enjoy high rates of saving, the shape of the consumption-age cross section is unaltered, and
life cycle expenditure profiles increase more with age for higher growth rates. In addition, the
simulation demonstrates that with utility from relative consumption high growth economies
should hold trade surpluses, as is often the case empirically.
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Figure 15: Saving and growth - a sensitivity analysis for different levels of relative consump-
tion (γ)
Figure 15 presents a sensitivity analysis for different levels of γ, from zero (the baseline
case) to one. The figure clearly indicates that to get a strong positive relation between
economic growth and the saving rate through the relative consumption channel γ needs to
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be close to one. Results presented in Gruber (2018) suggest this is indeed the case, as it
shows relative income, rather than absolute income, to be the determinant of household
saving behavior.
6 Conclusion
High household saving rates in rapidly growing developing countries have been key factors
in determining international capital and trade flows for the several past decades. The excess
saving created by growth allowed poorer but rapidly developing countries to maintain a
trade surplus and lend to richer but slower growing economies. With large parts of the world
(China, India etc.) poised for a prolonged catching up process, this trend may dominate
international capital markets over the next several decades as well.
Yet mainstream utility functions – which play a key part in current macroeconomic
modeling – not only do not account for this phenomenon but in fact predict the opposite:
high growth countries are supposed to have low saving rates, and effectively borrow from
the rest of the world.
This paper examines the ability of a standard life-cycle model to replicate the three central
stylized facts of the growth-saving relation: a positive relation from aggregate growth to the
aggregate household saving ratio (with growth fully affecting the income path of individual
cohorts); a correlation between the aggregate growth rate and the household expenditure
growth rate over the life cycle; and a consumption-age cross-sectional distribution that is
largely invariant with regard to aggregate growth.
As demonstrated, even when adding the elements of growth uncertainty and credit con-
straints, the life-cycle model is unable to match the three stylized facts above. However,
utility from relative consumption presents itself as a viable explanation for all three. These
results highlight the inadequacies of current mainstream macroeconomic modeling frame-
works in dealing with high-growth environments.
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While this paper focuses on utility from relative consumption as a key empirically-
supported element that is able to replicate economic behavior in high-growth environments,
other explanations cannot be ruled out. It is important that the macroeconomic research
community become more aware of the the serious shortcomings of its current tool box, as
exposed in the rapid growth environment, and set out of rectify them.
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